Intertemporal State Budgeting by Bruce Baker et al.











The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Pioneer Institute, the German National Merit
Foundation, Boston University, and the U.S. Department of Commerce. The paper benefited greatly from
the comments and suggestions of James Stergios. We thank Jonathan Skinner and Felicitie Bell for providing
essential data. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2002 by Bruce Baker, Daniel Besendorfer and Laurence J. Kotlikoff.  All rights reserved.  Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Intertemporal State Budgeting
Bruce Baker, Daniel Besendorfer and Laurence J. Kotlikoff




This study presents intertemporal budgeting as of 1999 for all 50 U.S.states. Intertemporal state budgeting
compares the present value of a state ’s projected receipts with the present value of its projected expenditures
(exclusive of interest payments)plus the current value of its net debt (liabilities minus assets). Our projections start
with the 1999 U.S.Census Bureau ’s State Government Finances survey of receipts,expenditures,and debt.We
group these highly detailed data into a framework that is consistent with the National Income and Product Account
accounts. The 1999 Census data are the latest available.To project total receipts and expenditures for years beyond
1999,we first form average 1999 receipts and expenditures by age and sex using relative age-and sex-specific
receipts and expenditure profiles.We estimate these profiles the Current Population Survey and the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. Next we grow these averages using an assumed growth rate in labor productivity.
Finally,year-and state-specific age-sex population estimates are multiplied by projected average receipts and
expenditures by age and sex in that year to form that year ’s total projected state-specific receipts and
expenditures.We form our year-age-sex-and state-specific population projections using the 2001 Social Security
Administration ’s projection of the total U.S.population by age and sex in conjunction with the 1995 Census
projections on state-specific age-sex population shares. Our base-case results use a 3 percent real discount rate and
assume a 1.5 percent real productivity growth rate.They show a great range of state intertemporal imbalances.
When measured as a share of (scaled by)the present value of projected expenditures, imbalances range from
positive 48 percent in Alaska to negative 19 percent in Vermont. These and other findings proved to be very robust
to changes in productivity and discount rates as well as changes in demographic assumptions. State official
liabilities are not good proxies for their intertemporal imbalances.Indeed, the correlation between scaled state
intertemporal imbalances and gross state debt scaled by state income is essentially zero.The corresponding
correlation based on net state debt is negative.Given this,it ’s not surprising that we find very little correspondence
between the ranking of the states based on their intertemporal budget imbalances and the credit ratings published
by either Moody ’s or Standard and Poor's. Our user-friendly program for calculating intertemporal state budget
imbalances (the difference between a)the present value of expenditures plus net debt and b)the present value of
receipts)is written in Excel and is available for download upon request.Users can input their own discount and
growth rates.They also can modify the demographic projections.In addition,the program contains historical Census
expenditure and receipts data.Based on these data or their own knowledge of current trends in their state ’s public
finances,users can override all or some of the program ’s short-term receipts and expenditures projections.Users
can also have the program begin its projections starting in a year they specify.
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I.  Introduction 
 
In the Fall of 2000, the State of Massachusetts announced that the Big Dig project 
– the nation’s largest highway construction project – would cost roughly 10 percent more 
than previously projected.  Given that the total costs had been projected at $14 billion, a 
10 percent overrun was no minor matter.  The announcement led to Congressional 
hearings, the firing of the top state official overseeing the project, and the establishment 
of a new management team.  A few weeks after the announcement, the citizens of 
Massachusetts went to the polls to vote, among other things, on a referendum to cut the 
state’s income tax rate by roughly 10 percent. 
The referendum passed, but in voting for or against the referendum, one thing was 
clear.  None of the voters had any real understanding about the degree to which the Big 
Dig cost overrun would seriously undermine the state’s long-term finances.  The reason is 
that the State of Massachusetts, like all other states in the country, does no long-term 
fiscal analysis or, for that matter, any long-term fiscal planning.  Hence, there was no 
way of comparing the large one-time additional Big Dig costs with, for example, the 
present value of the state’s future expenditures.  Consequently, none of the Massachusetts 
voters were in a position to know whether the state could really afford the tax cut. 
This paper seeks to rectify this situation.  It presents an intertemporal budgeting 
for 2001 for all 50 U.S. states.  Intertemporal state budgeting compares the present value 
of a state’s projected receipts with the present value of its projected expenditures 
(exclusive of interest payments) plus the current value of its net debt (liabilities minus 
assets).  Armed with a state intertemporal budget, policymakers can answer a host of 
questions that would otherwise be very hard to entertain.  These include:  How large is 
the state’s intertemporal budget imbalance? What immediate and permanent percentage   3 
 
tax hikes or spending cuts are needed to eliminate the state’s intertemporal budget 
imbalance? And, are state credit ratings correlated with state intertemporal imbalances? 
Our projections start with the 1999 U.S. Census Bureau’s State Government 
Finances survey of receipts, expenditures, and debt.  We group these highly detailed data 
into a framework that is consistent with the National Income and Product Account 
accounts. The 1999 Census data are the latest available.  To project total receipts and 
expenditures for years beyond 1999, we first form average 1999 receipts and 
expenditures by age and sex using relative age- and sex-specific receipts and expenditure 
profiles.  We estimate these profiles using data culled from the Current Population (CPS) 
and Consumer Expenditure (CEX) surveys.  Next we grow these averages using an 
assumed growth rate of labor productivity.  Finally, year- and state-specific age-sex 
population estimates are multiplied by projected average receipts and expenditures by age 
and sex in that year to form that year’s total projected state-specific receipts and 
expenditures.  We form our year-age-sex- and state-specific population projections using 
the 2001 Social Security Administration’s projection of the total U.S. population by age 
and sex in conjunction with the 1995 Census projections on state-specific age-sex 
population shares.
1 
Our Excel program (written in VBA for Excel) is user-friendly and available for 
download upon request.  Users can input their own discount and growth rates.  They can 
also modify the demographic projections.  In addition, the program contains historical 
Census expenditure and receipts data.  Based on these data or their own knowledge of 
current trends in their state’s public finances, users can override all or some of the 
                                                 
1 The Social Security Administration data also include pre-2001 population counts.  We use data from 1999 
onward.    4 
 
program’s short-term receipts and expenditures projections.  Users can also choose to 
have the program begin its projections only after a year they specify.  Finally, users can 
choose the base year for their intertemporal budget analysis.  For example, they can 
determine the intertemporal imbalance that prevailed in 1999 just as easily as the 
imbalance prevailing in 2001. 
Our base-case results assume a 3 percent real discount rate and a 1.5 percent real 
productivity growth rate.  They show a great variation across states in their intertemporal 
imbalances measured as a percent of the present value of projected expenditures.   
Imbalances range from 48 percent in Alaska to -19 percent in Vermont!  These and other 
findings proved to be very robust to changes in productivity and discount rates as well as 
changes in demographic assumptions.  
Remarkably, we find no relationship between a state’s long-term fiscal problems 
and its general obligation bond rating.  This is not surprising given that there is a) 
essentially no correlation between states’ scaled intertemporal imbalances and their ratios 
of gross debt to state income and b) a negative correlation between states’ scaled 
intertemporal imbalances and their ratios of net debt to state income. 
The next section, II, lays out our projection methodology.  Section III presents our 
data.  Section IV describes our findings and considers their sensitivity to assumed 
discount rates, growth rates, and demographic assumptions.  Section V compares state 
intertemporal budget gaps with Standard & Poor's and Moody's state general obligation 
bond ratings, and Section VI compares them with official debt figures.  Section VII 
summarizes and concludes the paper.   5 
 
II.  Methodology 
  Our projection of each state’s total receipts and expenditures in each post-1999 
year begins with a calculation of average expenditures and receipts by age and sex in 
1999, broken down by type of receipt and expenditure.  We illustrate this calculation for 
expenditures.  The calculation for receipts is identical. 
 
Calculating Relative Expenditure and Receipt Profiles 
Let Ei,s,b stand for the value of a total expenditure of type i in state s in base year 
b, and form 
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where i and a denote expenditure type and age and m and f refer to male and female. The 
term ēi,m,s,40,b stands for the average expenditure of type i on 40 year-old males in state s 
in year b.  Ri,j,a stands for the ratio of a) average expenditures of type i made on age group 
a of sex j to b) the average expenditures of type i made on 40-year-old males.
2  Note that 
our age-sex relative expenditure and receipt profiles are not indexed by year or by state.  
Instead, we use the latest available nationwide profiles and assume they will maintain 
their current shape through time and that they are applicable for all states.
3  The term 
P,j,a,s,b stands for the number of people of sex j who are age a in state s in the base year b. 
  Given the values of the relative expenditure profile, Ri,j,a and the population 
counts P,j,a,s,b, equation (1) is used to solve for ēi,m,40,s,b.  Once this value is known, we can 
                                                 
2 We modify this procedure in the case of state workers' pension income.  Specifically, we calculate the 
relative pension income profit using a 60-year-old male, rather than a 40-year-old male as our reference 
group. 
3 Data are available to calculate state-specific profiles, but their use may add more noise than signal to our 
calculations because the profiles would be calculated with significantly fewer observations.   6 
 
calculate year b average expenditures of type i for all other age groups a and sex j in state 
s, ēi,j,a,s,b, from 
(2)   a j i b s m i b s a j i R e e , , , , 40 , , , , , , =    for j = m, f. 
  Total projected expenditures of type i in year t in state s, Ei,s,t, can now be written 
as: 
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where g is the constant growth rate of labor productivity. 
  Not all expenditures and receipts have an age-sex pattern.  For example, there 
seems no way to distinguish the level of police and fire protection by age and sex.   
Hence, for such public goods, we assume that the relative distribution profiles are flat 
(the Ri,m,a and Ri,f,a values equal 1 for all ages and sexes).  This translates into assuming 
that the per capita level of such expenditures grows with labor productivity, so that the 
total level of these expenditures grows with population plus productivity.   
In the case of state educational expenditures, we form a) expenditures per child in 
elementary and secondary school and b) expenditures per child in higher education.   
These amounts are assumed to grow with labor productivity. The total level of those 
expenditures in each future year is projected to equal these productivity-adjusted per 
capita amounts multiplied by the number of children in the particular education group in 
the year in question. 
 
Calculating a State’s Intertemporal Budget Imbalance 
  If we let Ti,s,t stand for total government receipts of type i in state s in year t, the 
state’s intertemporal budget imbalance (GAPs) is given by   7 
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where Ds stands for net debt of state s at time b, defined as the value of all state liabilities 
minus all state assets, and r is the discount rate. 
The program starts by projecting population counts by age and sex and state based 
on an assumed population scenario.  Next it distributes 1999 budgetary aggregates using 
equation (1).  It then uses assumed productivity growth rates to determine average 
expenditures and taxes of various kinds by age and sex and future years.  These amounts 
are then multiplied by the age- and sex-specific population counts to determine total 
values of the different receipts and expenditures in each future year.  The final step uses 
equation (3) to form the present value budget imbalance. 
To compare results across states, we divide the absolute value of each state’s 
intertemporal budget imbalance by either the present value of its expenditures or the 
present value of its receipts.  The resulting percentages indicate what immediate and 
permanent percentage cut in expenditures or percentage increase in receipts is needed to 
achieve present value budget balance.  We also show the immediate and permanent 
percentage cuts in specific expenditures and increases in specific taxes that would, by 
themselves, balance the state’s intertemporal budget. 
 
III.  The Data 
 
This section first describes our population data and projections.  It then turns to 
the Census classifications and our use of the CPS and CEX surveys to generate relative 
receipt and expenditure profiles by age and sex. 
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Population Projections 
Our population projections are based in part on the intermediate (II) projection of 
population by age and sex used by the Social Security Administration (SSA) in their 2001 
OASDI Trustees Report.
4  This projection provides population estimates through 2080.  
To form values for the P,j,a,t, we simply multiply SSA national population counts by each 
state’s age- and sex-specific population shares in year t. 
These state-specific population shares are created using a 1995 Census projection 
by Campbell (1996), which forecasts population totals for each state by age and sex 
through 2025.
5  Day (1996) describes fertility, mortality, and international migration 
assumptions used by the Census.  Unfortunately, the Census has not updated these state 
forecasts since 1995, although it may do so in the near future.
6 
In our baseline calculations we form the average annual growth rate of age-, sex-, 
and state-specific population shares between 2021-2025 and grow the 2025 age- and sex-
specific state population shares for the years 2026 through 2030 based on this rate.  After 
2030, we assume the shares remain constant.  The year to which we extend trend growth 
in the age- and sex-specific state population shares can be modified by the user in 
running the program. 
As a test for the validity of the calculated shares, we compared the resulting state 
population totals with state population estimates provided by the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census for the years 1997 through 1999.  The state population totals as well as the 
national population total are consistently approximately 4 percent higher in our 
                                                 
4 Report available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR01/index.html. Chapter V provides an exact 
description of all assumptions that have been made for the three scenarios. 
5 Projections are also available based on race and Hispanic origin. 
6 Unfortunately, the Census did not retain the state-specific net migration data and other data that we would 
need to update their projections on our own.   9 
 
calculations than in the Census' estimates.  This difference occurs mainly due to the fact 
that, unlike the Social Security Administration estimates, the Census estimates exclude 
U.S. citizens, including members of the military, residing abroad.   
For the purpose of our study, however, this is not overly problematic.  A higher 
state population, as long as it is consistent over all states, lowers our estimate of per 
capita receipts and expenditures, but once we multiply these values by our higher than 
Census population estimates, we still end up with an unbiased projection of total 
expenditures and receipts in each year. 
  Table 1 shows how the state total populations and age-compositions are projected 
to evolve between 1999 and 2050.  The trends are very clear.  The share of population 
age 18 and under shrinks in every state from, on average, 27 percent to, on average, 22 
percent over the next fifty years.  At the same time the average state share of population 
of age 65 and older rise from 12 percent to 22 percent.  In 1999 there was no state whose 
youth outnumbered its elderly.  In 2050 29 states will have more oldsters than youngsters.  
This aging of the states’ residents and voters will likely have important implications for 
the types and levels of expenditures and receipts selected by state governments.  
  If the elderly’s population share is rising and that of the youth is declining, what 
happens to overall dependency ratios? The answer is they rise.  The share of the 
population that is in its working years – the middle aged – shrinks in every state.  
 
Census Data on State Government Finances 
  Our state budget data come from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999 State 
Government Finances survey.  These data are aggregated to roughly accord with NIPA   10 
 
accounting conventions.  A perfect correspondence is not possible because certain data 
needed for that purpose is not available on a state-by-state basis, e.g. depreciation.   
However, the data do conform to the NIPA concept of net lending, which is a cash 
measure of the government's borrowing requirement.  Table 2 shows the budget 
categories used in the study. 
  Overall the resulting NIPA-like figures differ somewhat from the original Census 
data ordering since NIPA conventions not only aggregate the much more detailed Census 
data but also consolidate them.  In the NIPA’s, some items like health expenditures have 
charges netted against spending, while the Census data show the transactions on a gross 
basis.  It is important to note that both the Census data and the resulting NIPA-like 
estimates include transactions for all state funds, not just “general funds”.  
 
Relative Age-Sex Receipt and Expenditure Profiles 
The values for relative age-sex receipt and expenditures profiles come from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), the Current Expenditure Survey (CEX), and the Health 
Care Financing Agency (HCFA) respectively.  The CPS was used to form relative 
profiles for state income taxes, state workers retirement contributions, state pension plan 
retirement benefits, and disability payments to state workers.  The CEX was used to form 
relative profiles for motor vehicle licenses, property taxes, other taxes (mostly licenses), 
general sales taxes, and eight separate excise taxes.  HCFA data, supplied by Jonathan 
Skinner, were used to create Medicaid relative expenditure profiles, which were used for 
all welfare-related aggregates.  The profile of educational expenditures is a step function 
calculated by dividing expenditures on children in elementary school, secondary school,   11 
 
and higher education. All other budgetary items are assumed to be equally distributed by 
age and sex.    
Figure 1 presents graphs of all non-flat distribution profiles used in this study.  
Table 2 lists all budget categories for which we have assumed a flat age-sex profile 
making the projected per capita levels of these receipts or expenditures the same in a 
given year regardless of age or sex.  
The CEX data used to form average annual expenditures by age and sex were 
taken from the 1999 survey.  CPS data are extracted from the Annual Demographic 
Survey March 2000 Supplement.  To smooth the original data we usually apply second-
order polynomials.  The only exceptions are the welfare profile, the retirement-benefits 
profile, and the unemployment insurance contributions profile, for which we used a step 
function and five-year moving averages, respectively.  The reason for this different 
treatment is the special shapes of these profiles, which would be missed by smoothing 
with second-order polynomials.  
Table 4 shows population shares by state of the young and old as well as the 
shares of total state expenditures spent on these age groups.  Expenditures exclude 
interest payments but include retirement benefits and other state transfer payments. The 
first thing to note is that while youngsters (those under 19) represent, on average, 27 
percent of state populations, on average they receive only 13 percent of spending.  For 
oldsters, the story is the reverse.  Their population share averages 12 percent across 
states, but their expenditure share averages 31 percent.  
The share of total expenditures spent on youngsters is less than the share spent on 
oldsters in all states except Alaska and Hawaii.  The explanation for Alaska is its   12 
 
remarkably small – 6 percent – share of elderly.  For Hawaii the explanation is twofold.  
First, Hawaii has quite high elementary educational expenditures per student.  Second. 
Hawaii spends relatively little on the health sector, which is used much more extensively 
by the elderly.  At the other extreme are Ohio and Oregon.  Both states spend 8 percent of 
all their expenditures on the young, but Ohio spends 38 percent and Oregon 37 percent on 
the old.  Clearly, given current spending patterns, aging means one thing in Alaska and 
Hawaii and something quite different in Ohio and Oregon.  
 
IV.  State Intertemporal Budget Imbalances 
 
For our baseline scenario we assumed an annual per capita productivity growth 
rate of 1.5 percent and an annual real discount rate of 3 percent.  We also extended the 
trend in state-specific age-sex population shares from 2025 through 2030.  Beyond 2030 
we assumed that each state’s share of the total population of a given age and sex equals 
its 2030 share.
7  All discounting is done back to the base year, 1999.  Absolute dollar 
figures are presented in 1999 dollars.  
Figure 2 and columns 2 and 5 in Table 5 provide an overview of the base-case 
results.  It shows state imbalances measured as percentages of both the present values of 
expenditures and receipts.  Three-fifths of the states have a positive intertemporal budget 
imbalance.  Alaska and North Dakota have the largest imbalances, equivalent to 48 
percent and 42 percent of the present values of their expenditures and 77 percent and 80 
percent of the present values of their receipts.  Wyoming is the next worse off fiscally 
                                                 
7 One has to keep in mind that this procedure might lead to inconsistent results for the U.S. as a closed 
system since it is obvious that for example, not all states' shares of total U.S. population can grow at the 
same time. For our purpose, however, this method can be chosen, since it is not the goal of this study to 
conduct an investigation of the complete U.S. but a comparative measure of its single states.   13 
 
speaking.  It has an imbalance of 20 percent when measured relative to expenditures and 
23 percent when measured relative to receipts.  Another eight states, including the 
heavily populated states of California and New York, have imbalances ranging from 10 
to 16 percent, when measured relative to expenditures.  Vermont has the smallest 
imbalance, indeed a negative imbalance, equal to -19 percent of the present value of 
expenditures and -15 percent of the present value of receipts.  Note that the expenditures 
and receipts rankings of the states’ long-term fiscal shortfalls are identical for all but four 
states.  However, for some states, the two measures are quite different in magnitude.   
The differences across states in the sizes of their imbalances are driven, in part, by 
short-run fiscal outcomes that are being projected, given our methodology, to continue 
into the future.  Alaska and North Dakota are two cases in point.  Alaska experienced a 
40 percent decline in total tax and non-tax receipts in 1999 compared with 1998.  North 
Dakota experienced a 26 percent increase in total welfare expenditures across the two 
years.  These two examples suggest the need to improve the current analysis by taking 
into account the temporary nature of certain fiscal policies in forming long-term fiscal 
projections.  On the other hand, they clarify that there are very real problems facing both 
Alaska and North Dakota.   
 
Intertemporal Budget Imbalances in 1990 
The above results indicate the intertemporal imbalances that states face if they 
maintain in the future their current age- and sex-specific pattern of expenditures and 
taxes, except for an adjustment for productivity growth.  Of course, these spending and 
tax patterns are likely to change over time, especially for states with large imbalances.    14 
 
Were we to know exactly what the future would bring, we could determine the extent to 
which actual, as opposed, to projected future fiscal policy is in intertemporal balance.   
This, of course, is impossible.  However, it is possible to go back in time and use 
the spending and taxes that actually materialized, at least from that date in the past, to the 
present.  We did this in preparing Figure 3.  Specifically, we chose 1990 as the base year 
(i.e., we discounted back to 1990), used actual data from 1990 to 1999 and projected data 
from 2000 on using the method described above.  Table 6 compares the results for 1990 
with those for 1999.  Although the imbalance rankings of several states differs somewhat 
across the two periods  (e.g., Iowa’s rank of 37 fell to 33 and Massachusetts’ rank rose 
from 36 to 39), the overall rank correlation between imbalances across the two years is 
.996.  For all but six states, the intertemporal imbalances declined over the decade.  
 
Achieving Fiscal Sustainability 
What do the 1999 findings imply for achieving sustainable fiscal policies in the 
different states? As mentioned, the imbalance measures also indicate actions that could 
be taken to achieve fiscal sustainability.  Thus, the State of Alaska could halve all its 
expenditures or raise all its receipts by four-fifths on a permanent basis to achieve long-
term fiscal sustainability.  Either option represents a wrenching change in policy.  On the 
other hand, Vermont could reduce its receipts by 15 percent or raise its expenditures by 
19 percent on a permanent basis. 
We also considered the reductions in particular types of expenditures and 
increases in particular types of receipts that could achieve fiscal sustainability.  Certain of   15 
 
these policies are clearly infeasible.  For instance, Alaska would have to decrease its 
educational expenses by roughly 400 percent to get its long-term finances in order.   
For other states, there is a range of feasible options.  For example, Indiana could 
either lower its educational expenditures by 4.16 percent or decrease its health 
expenditures by 1.45 percent to restore sustainability.  Another option for this state would 
be to raise individual income taxes by 1.68 percent or increase its sales taxes by 1.35 
percent.   
Interestingly, there is a very substantial variation across states that have similar 
imbalances in their menus of potential fiscal adjustments.  Take, for example, Hawaii and 
Maryland.  Both states have imbalances totaling between 8 and 9 percent of the present 
values of their expenditures.  But Hawaii’s income tax base is proportionately smaller 
than that of Maryland, and achieving fiscal sustainability through an increase in state 
income taxes would require a 35.9 percent tax hike in Hawaii, but only a 20.6 percent 
increase in Maryland.   
What does this long-term fiscal analysis tell us about Massachusetts’ ability to 
afford cost overruns in the Big Dig project? The 10 percent rise in the costs of 
Massachusetts' Big Dig project equals $1.4 billion.  Given that in our baseline scenario 
Massachusetts has an absolute present value imbalance of $146.5 billion dollars, this 
corresponds to an increase of roughly 1 percent in the state’s long-term fiscal problem.  
To meet these costs, Massachusetts could cut its expenditures, on a permanent basis, by 
.12 percent or to raise its receipts, on a permanent basis, by .09 percent.  Hence, the Big 
Dig cost overrun turns out to be a rather small problem in the wider scheme of things.  
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Sensitivity Analysis 
The ranking of the states based on their imbalances turns out to be relatively 
insensitive to changes in assumptions.  Consider first the productivity growth rate, which, 
in our baseline case, equals 1.5 percent. As shown in Tables 7 and 8, lowering that rate to 
1 percent or raising it to 2 percent leads to fairly similar cross-state patterns of fiscal 
imbalances when measured either as a share of the present value of spending or as a share 
of the present value of receipts.  The sizes of the imbalances are also generally within a 
percentage point or two of their base-case values.  Higher productivity growth worsens 
the states’ fiscal positions because it increases the absolute size of the gaps in each future 
year between receipts and expenditures.  The tables also show little sensitivity of the 
results to extending the growth trends of age-sex state population shares for a decade 
rather than for just five years.  In all cases, the differences in scaled imbalances is less 
than half of a percentage point.  
The choice of discount rate makes a bigger difference to the results, with higher 
discount rates lowering the measured imbalance.  Take, for example, NY’s base-case 
imbalance of 12.9 percent of spending.  The base case assumes a 3 percent real rate of 
discount.  Using a 4 percent discount rate lowers the measure of the imbalance to 11.3 
percent.  The difference between the two figures is 12.4 percent, indicating that the rate at 
which a state can borrow can make a material impact on the sustainability of its policy.  
 
V.  State Credit Ratings 
 
How do our findings compare with state general obligation bond ratings by 
Standard and Poor's (S&P's) and Moody's, which purport to be based on a state’s long-  17 
 
term fiscal condition.
8  In making this comparison, we used 1999 ratings for the 41 out of 
the 50 states that are rated by both agencies.  These states and their ratings are listed in 
Table 9.  We transformed the letter-based rating systems into a cardinal one, ending up 
with a scale ranging from 21 for AAA to 1 for C.  The resulting numerical credit ratings 
for both companies range from 14.4 to 21, with an average of 19.2 for both agencies and 
standard deviations of 1.46 for S&P's and 1.38 for Moody's.  
The ratings of the two agencies are very similar.  Indeed, the correlation 
coefficient between the two sets of ratings is .92.  In contrast, the correlation between the 
values of our relative imbalance measures and either firm’s credit ratings is very low.  
When the imbalance is measured relative to the present value of receipts, its correlation is 
-.14 with the S&P ratings and -.15 with the Moody’s ratings.  Note that a correlation is 
what one would expect since a higher imbalance should be associated with a lower credit 
rating.  For imbalances measured relative to expenditures the correlations are -.16 and      
-.19, respectively.  We also used the ratings and imbalance measures to rank the states on 
the size of their fiscal problems.  The rank correlation coefficients from this analysis are 
also remarkably low -- .21 for S&P's and .23 for Moody's.  Finally, we considered 
whether the 1990 credit rating rankings are more highly correlated with the 1990 ranking 
of states based on intertemporal imbalances scaled by expenditures.  The answer is no.  
The rank correlation is .24 for S&P's and .13 for Moody's.
9  
 
                                                 
8 Compare Standard and Poor's (2000) for instance. 
9 Only 38 states were ranked by both agencies in 1990.  Also Moody's rating system was less detailed in 
1990 than in 1999.  
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Apparently, the demographic factors included in our analysis are being neglected 
by the credit rating agencies.  This is particularly surprising given that these agencies 
seem to understand that long-term demographics are important to fiscal sustainability.  
For example, in a recently published study by Standard and Poor’s for the 15 member 
countries of the European Union, Kraemer and Marchand (2002) conclude that "The 
sovereign credit ratings of highly rated European Union (EU-15) members could begin to 
come under downward pressure by end of the decade if no progress is made in further 
fiscal consolidation and structural reform to counter the financial challenges of aging 
societies."
10   
State credit ratings make a material difference to the price states pay for credit and 
their ability to use credit to deal with unexpected shocks to expenditures or receipts.
11  
For 1999, the yield spread between an average AAA rated general obligation bond and 
one rated AA was .08 and .11 percentage points for maturities of 1 year and 30 years, 
respectively.  The corresponding spreads between an AAA rating and an A rating are .25 
and .27 percentage points.  And the two AAA-BBB spreads are .45 and .52 percentage 
points.  For certain maturities, the yield spreads were even higher -- .67 percentage points 
between a BBB rating and a AAA for 13 years maturity.   
Based on our findings, Alaska, Oregon, Ohio, and Maryland are paying much less 
than they should for credit, while Connecticut, Arkansas, West Virginia, and Louisiana 
are paying much more than they should.  Take Maryland and Louisiana, for example.  
While Maryland’s 1991 scaled intertemporal imbalances were roughly three times larger 
                                                 
10 These authors predict a remarkable increase in ratings that are below the current lowest rating (the 'A' 
rating on Greece) to four countries by 2023 and even to seven countries by the early 2030s.  
11 See Asdrubaldi,. Sorensen, and Yosha (1996). 
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than those of Louisiana, Maryland’s 1999 S&P credit rating was AAA, while Louisiana’s 
was A-.  Another telling comparison is between Connecticut and Arkansas.  Both had 
1999 S&P credit ratings of AA even though Connecticut’s imbalances were close to 
negative 10 percent and those of Arkansas were close to positive ten percent.  
 
VI.  Is Official Debt a Good Proxy for a State’s Intertemporal Budget Imbalance? 
In addition to bearing little relationship to credit ratings, our intertemporal 
imbalances are only weakly correlated with a traditional measure of fiscal sustainability, 
namely state government debt.  The correlation between absolute total gross debt and the 
absolute intertemporal imbalance is .67.  However, the correlation with total net debt, 
which is presumably most relevant to a state’s fiscal status, is -.59.  We also measured the 
correlations between a) the scaled imbalance and b) gross or net debt scaled by total 
annual state personal income of 1999 as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA).  The correlation of the gross debt measure with our imbalance measure is .10 
when imbalances are scaled relative to the present value of receipts and .09 when they are 
scaled relative to the present value of expenditures.  As before we found much lower 
correlations with the net debt measured as a share of state income.  The correlation is -.45 
when imbalances are scaled by receipts and -.38 when they are scaled by expenditures.  
The correlations between state gross debt scaled by state income and credit ratings are, as 
expected, negative: -.39 for S&P's and -.38 for Moody's.   
Another interesting result concerns the budget deficit in 1999.  The strong 
influence of the base year choice is reflected in a .83 correlation between the absolute 
deficit and the absolute intertemporal imbalance.  Even when we use the imbalance   20 
 
relative to present value of expenditures we still observe a correlation of .34. The 
absolute deficit is also negatively correlated with credit ratings, with a correlation of -.14 
for S&P's and -.25 for Moody's.   
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 
This study compares the long-term fiscal positions of the 50 U.S. states.  The 
study combines long-term demographic projections with state budget data and relative 
age-sex receipt and expenditure profiles to measure each state’s present value budget 
imbalance.  Our findings indicate a great deal of heterogeneity across states in the 
magnitude of their long-term fiscal problems.  Three fifths of the states have 
unsustainable policies.  Of these, one third need to make major adjustments to rectify 
their fiscal circumstances.  This conclusion turns out to be very robust to changes in 
assumed productivity growth rates, demographic assumptions, and discount rates.  
Remarkably, our ranking of states based on their fiscal imbalances bears no 
relationship to the state credit ratings of either Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s.  If our 
results are to be believed, many states are being forced to borrow at higher rates than they 
should, while others are being permitted to borrow at lower rates than is justified by their 
fiscal conditions.  There is also only a weak relationship between states’ intertemporal 
imbalances and their ratios of debt-to-income. 
Our work is at an early stage.  Refined projections of both short- and long-term 
fiscal flows that take into account the business cycle, soon-to-be released Census 
projections of state populations by age and sex, and likely changes over time in the age-
sex profiles of different state government receipts and expenditures are needed to more   21 
 
accurately measure state intertemporal imbalances.  Still, even at this early stage, 
measuring states’ long-term fiscal affairs appears to offer a much better perspective on 
the sustainability of their fiscal policies than does the very short-term budget analysis 
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Relative Receipts and Expenditure Profiles 
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*  Individual income tax profile also used for distributions of disability expenditures 
**  Motor vehicle licenses profile also used for distribution of other taxes (mostly licenses). 
***  Welfare grants profile also used for distribution of health expenditures, vendor medical payments, 






















































State Population Projections 
 




Share of 18 
and Under 
in 1999 
Share of 18 
and Under 
in 2050 
Share of 65 
and Over 
in 1999 
Share of 65 
and Over 
in 2050 
AK  670927  993046  .32 .30 .06 .11 
AL  4586516  5827379  .26 .20 .13 .22 
AR  2705597  3406933  .27 .19 .14 .26 
AZ  4876756  7249814  .29 .23 .13 .24 
CA  33619448  56943841  .30 .28 .10 .14 
CO  4256286  5851915  .27 .21 .11 .23 
CT  3412554  4212827  .26 .22 .14 .20 
DE  788767  956413  .26 .21 .12 .21 
FL  15602016  23833595  .25 .18 .18 .29 
GA  8061853  11038420  .28 .22 .10 .19 
HI  1293270  2109723  .28 .25 .12 .18 
IA  3002511  3371604  .26 .20 .15 .25 
ID  1365186  1956863  .30 .22 .11 .24 
IL  12490615  14933014  .28 .24 .12 .18 
IN  6239474  7227467  .27 .21 .12 .21 
KS  2753756  3470818  .28 .23 .13 .22 
KY  4126834  4762074  .26 .19 .13 .23 
LA  4581314  5713714  .29 .23 .12 .20 
MA  6421504  7725009  .26 .21 .14 .20 
MD  5442565  7032734  .27 .22 .11 .18 
ME  1304827  1585496  .25 .19 .13 .24 
MI  10041851  11080589  .27 .22 .12 .20 
MN  4979903  6147436  .28 .21 .12 .23 
MO  5716425  6937492  .27 .21 .13 .22 
MS  2904341  3474298  .29 .22 .12 .21 
MT  971911  1259486  .27 .20 .13 .28 
NC  7973142  10489615  .26 .19 .12 .24 
ND  683921  816338  .27 .22 .15 .26 
NE  1759665  2151615  .28 .22 .14 .24 
NH  1259161  1606031  .27 .20 .11 .21 
NJ  8458247  10747844  .26 .22 .13 .19 
NM  1900258  2975224  .30 .26 .11 .18 
NV  1884031  2595936  .26 .19 .11 .23 
NY  18863971  22036094  .27 .23 .13 .18 
OH  11735599  12939606  .27 .21 .13 .22 
OK  3484431  4566304  .27 .21 .14 .24 
OR  3481088  4958532  .26 .19 .14 .27 
PA  12654797  14015489  .25 .21 .15 .23 
RI  1035099  1283325  .26 .22 .15 .21 
SC  3973569  5205194  .27 .20 .12 .23   29 
 




Share of 18 
and Under 
in 1999 
Share of 18 
and Under 
in 2050 
Share of 65 
and Over 
in 1999 
Share of 65 
and Over 
in 2050 
SD  798786  962564  .29 .22 .14 .25 
TN  5803674  7433537  .26 .20 .12 .22 
TX  20648775  30786326  .30 .26 .10 .18 
UT  2246190  3222979  .35 .27 .08 .20 
VA  7205927  9517227  .26 .21 .11 .20 
VT  635406  751066  .26 .20 .12 .23 
WA  6008285  8904257  .27 .21 .11 .23 
WI  5498460  6513296  .27 .21 .13 .23 
WV  1909950  2032099  .24 .17 .15 .27 




State Budget Categories 
Receipts Expenditures 
Individual income taxes  Executive and legislative 
Motor vehicle licenses  Tax collection and financial 
Property taxes  Net interest paid (baseyear only)  
Other taxes (mostly licences)  Other general public service 
Nontaxes  Police 
  Fines and forfeits  Fire 
  Donations  Law courts 
  Other  Prisons 
Corporate profits taxes  General economic 
Indirect business taxes and nontaxes  Agriculture 
  Sales taxes  Energy 
    General  Natural resources 
    Alcoholic beverages  Transportation 
    Amusements    Highways 
    Insurance premiums    Air transportation 
    Motor Fuels    Water transportation 
    Pari-mutuels    Transit and railroad 
    Public utilities  Other economic 
    Tobacco products    Liquor stores 
    Other     Lotteries 
    Property taxes    Misc. comm. act 
    Motor vehicle licenses    Parking 
    Other    Misc. insurance trust 
  Nontaxes    Water 
    Rents and royalties    Sewer 
    Special assessments    Sanitation 
    Fines    Other 
    Donations  Education 
    Tobacco settlement    Elementary and secondary education 
    Other    Higher education 
Contributions for social insurance    Libraries 
Intergovernmental Transfers    Education, nec. 
  Transportation  Health 
    Air transportation  Hospitals 
    Highways  Vendor medical payments 
    Other transportation  Recreation and culture 
  Health and hospitals  Disability 
  Education (head start, Indian, etc.)  Welfare 
  Employment   
  Housing   
  Welfare (includes Medicaid)   
  Utilities   
  Other   
Estate and gift taxes     31 
 
Retirement Unemployment  Insurance 
Receipts Receipts 
Benefits Benefits 
Interest (baseyear only)  Interest (baseyear only) 
Cash and Securities  Debt 
Insurance trusts  Long term 
  Retirement systems    Full faith and credit 
  Unemployment systems    Nonguaranteed 
  Workers' comp.  Short term 
  Other insurance trusts   
Other than insurance   
 




Budgetary Items Assumed to Have Flat Distribution Profiles 
Receipts Expenditures 
Fines and forfeits  Executive and legislative 
Donations  Tax collection and financial 
Other nontaxes  Other general public services 
Corporate profit taxes  Police 
Property taxes  Fire 
Motor vehicle licences (business)  Law courts 
Other business taxes  Prisons 
Rents and royalties  General economic 
Special assessments  Agriculture 
Fines Energy 
Donations Natural  resources 
Tobacco settlement  Highways 
Other business nontaxes  Air transportation 
Contributions for social insurance  Water transportation 
Air transportation grants  Transit and railroad 
Highway grants  Liquor stores 
Other transportation grants  Lotteries 
Health and hospital grants  Misc. comm. act 
Parking  Education grants (head start, 
  indian, agegroups 3 and 4)  Misc. insurance trust 
Employment grants  Water 
Housing grants  Sewer 
Utilities grants  Sanitation 
Other grants  Other economic 
Estate and gift taxes  Elementary and secondary education 




  (agegroups 19-22 only) 
   Libraries 
   Education, nec. 
   Hospitals 
   Recreation and culture 
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Table 4 




















those 65 and 
Over 
AK .32  .06 .26 .19 
AL .26  .13  .09 .34 
AR .27  .14 .11 .32 
AZ .29  .13  .14 .28 
CA .30  .10 .13 .30 
CO .27  .11 .12 .30 
CT .26  .14  .13 .31 
DE .26  .12  .13 .29 
FL .25  .18  .11  .35 
GA .28  .10 .12 .30 
HI .28  .12  .31  .24 
IA .26  .15  .12  .31 
ID .30  .11  .13  .29 
IL .28  .12  .11  .36 
IN .27  .12  .11  .32 
KS .28  .13  .12 .29 
KY .26  .13 .11 .33 
LA .29  .12  .12 .33 
MA .26  .14 .12 .34 
MD .27  .11 .11 .32 
ME .25  .13 .10 .37 
MI .27  .12  .09 .33 
MN .28  .12 .10 .34 
MO .27  .13 .12 .34 
MS .29  .12 .13 .32 
MT .27  .13 .14 .29 
NC .26  .12 .13 .30 
ND .27  .15 .18 .32 
NE .28  .14  .12 .30 
NH .27  .11 .11 .36 
NJ .26  .13  .16  .31 
NM .30  .11 .14 .30 
NV .26  .11 .11 .27 
NY .27  .13 .11 .35 
OH .27  .13 .08 .38 
OK .27  .14 .11 .32 





















those 65 and 
Over 
PA .25  .15  .11 .35 
RI .26  .15  .13  .34 
SC .27  .12  .11 .34 
SD .29  .14  .14 .32 
TN .26  .12  .10 .33 
TX .30  .10  .13 .31 
UT .35  .08  .15 .25 
VA .26  .11 .13 .28 
VT .26  .12  .13 .31 
WA .27  .11 .10 .32 
WI .27  .13  .11 .33 
WV .24  .15 .10 .33 
WY .28  .11 .16 .25   35 
 
Table 5 
Alternative Fiscal Adjustments that Would Achieve Present Value Budget Balance 
(percentage cuts in expenditures or increases in receipts) 
State  Total 






AK 48.12  415.26  230.30  77.24  --*  1437.74 
AL 10.22  63.23  20.82  9.95  43.54  26.80 
AR -6.49  -42.82  -13.84  -5.79  -22.86  -14.99 
AZ 4.77  31.90  15.98  4.55  14.74  7.27 
CA 12.96  86.44  30.94  13.56  24.30  26.35 
CO 13.48  99.73  35.65  13.59  28.90  38.80 
CT -9.99  -105.22  -23.82  -8.10  -24.71  -18.67 
DE -7.94  -48.42  -21.79  -6.75  -19.82  -56.34 
FL 2.58  28.64  5.02  2.62  --  3.63 
GA -1.28  -6.96  -2.83  -1.15  -2.86  -3.07 
HI 8.63  27.61  27.54  8.44  35.86  19.67 
IA 7.96  48.38  21.39  8.11  25.54  18.77 
ID -5.32  -47.83  -13.99  -4.82  -14.22  -12.09 
IL 0.96  8.48  2.29  0.90  2.81  2.05 
IN 0.68  4.16  1.45  0.63  1.68  1.35 
KS 8.41  46.72  22.12  8.03  20.68  15.91 
KY -1.29  -11.01  -2.79  -1.18  -4.51  -3.42 
LA 3.02  22.49  6.77  2.66  16.37  6.88 
MA 9.56  105.08  19.67  9.80  18.90  32.52 
MD 8.32  69.69  20.44  8.06  20.56  21.47 
ME -4.59  -56.91  -9.21  -4.00  -14.25  -12.81 
MI -11.95  -71.91  -32.34  -9.65  -25.44  -19.25 
MN 0.27  1.86  0.60  0.24  0.52  0.53 
MO -7.00  -68.54  -14.50  -6.34  -18.36  -17.27 
MS -4.35  -34.64  -8.63  -3.94  -23.07  -7.62 
MT 7.25  59.55  20.37  7.16  31.96  51.41 
NC -9.53  -69.41  -23.14  -7.93  -20.89  -23.76 
ND 42.22  336.14  32123.90  80.20 --  200.10 
NE -5.13  -32.96  -13.77  -4.76  -14.27  -12.40 
NH 14.70  200.40  27.86  15.69  455.65  56.60 
NJ -6.47  -43.51  -16.04  -5.24  -15.47  -12.32 
NM 13.48  96.51  33.41  14.29  73.29  30.49 
NV -4.53  -33.50  -13.73  -4.21  --  -4.76 
NY 12.92  147.67  22.19  12.92  29.13  46.87 
OH 10.73  87.59  21.96  10.24  28.82  24.09 
OK -2.92  -18.79  -7.41  -2.45  -7.68  -7.74 
OR 16.25  147.92  36.21  15.71  29.67  169.97 
PA 9.17  71.13  23.58  8.93  32.66  21.05 
RI 1.28  11.23  3.20  1.19  4.62  3.87   36 
 
State  Total 






SC 5.29  39.94  9.92  5.17  19.10  14.39 
SD 1.32  12.45  3.27  1.23  --  2.45 
TN 4.27  32.66  8.16  4.17  271.23  7.96 
TX -0.98  -7.04  -2.22  -0.89  --  -1.42 
UT -2.12  -12.74  -6.75  -2.00  -6.18  -4.95 
VA 0.88  5.74  2.23  0.84  1.57  2.31 
VT -18.79  -190.76  -47.99  -15.12  -68.12  -59.38 
WA 9.29  66.09  23.17  9.58  --  14.58 
WI -9.36  -66.53  -20.95  -7.48  -14.65  -15.69 
WV -6.02  -65.19  -13.41  -5.43  -30.47  -15.99 
WY 20.46  209.10  66.47  23.35 --  60.75 
 
 * State without individual income taxation.   37 
 
Table 6  State Intertemporal Budget Imbalances in 1990 and 1999   
 
(measured as a percentage of the present values of expenditures and receipts) 
























AK  47.58  74.30 50  48.12  77.24 50 
AL  10.63  10.38 40  10.22  9.95 40 
AR  -4.95  -4.44 9  -6.49  -5.79 8 
AZ 6.67  6.39 30  4.77  4.55 30 
CA  13.72  14.33 44  12.96  13.56 43 
CO  12.73  12.77 43  13.48  13.59 44 
CT  -8.26  -6.78 3  -9.99  -8.10 3 
DE  -6.50  -5.53 6  -7.94  -6.75 6 
FL 3.91  3.98 26  2.58  2.62 27 
GA 0.00  0.00 19  -1.28  -1.15 19 
HI 8.72  8.53 34  8.63  8.44 36 
IA 9.79  10.00 37  7.96  8.11 33 
ID  -4.23  -3.84 10  -5.32  -4.82 11 
IL 1.89  1.77 22  0.96  0.90 24 
IN 1.54  1.43 21  0.68  0.63 22 
KS 8.17  7.81 33  8.41  8.03 35 
KY  -0.04  -0.04 18  -1.29  -1.18 18 
LA 6.76  6.03 31  3.02  2.66 28 
MA 9.66  9.87 36  9.56  9.80 39 
MD 8.93  8.65 35  8.32  8.06 34 
ME  -2.64  -2.31 15  -4.59  -4.00 13 
MI  -9.13  -7.49 2  -11.95  -9.65 2 
MN 2.17  1.97 23  0.27  0.24 21 
MO  -5.61  -5.09 7  -7.00  -6.34 7 
MS  -3.41  -3.09 13  -4.35  -3.94 15 
MT 7.15  7.08 32  7.25  7.16 32 
NC  -6.58  -5.53 5  -9.53  -7.93 4 
ND  42.05  78.52 49  42.22  80.20 49 
NE  -4.05  -3.78 11  -5.13  -4.76 12 
NH  14.93  15.94 46  14.70  15.69 46 
NJ -3.73  -3.08  12  -6.47  -5.24  9 
NM  14.16  15.07 45  13.48  14.29 45 
NV  -2.94  -2.74 14  -4.53  -4.21 14 
NY  12.68  12.64 42  12.92  12.92 42 
OH  11.97  11.47 41  10.73  10.24 41 
OK  -1.36  -1.15 16  -2.92  -2.45 16 
OR  16.63  16.06 47  16.25  15.71 47 
PA  10.40  10.13 38  9.17  8.93 37   38 
 
1990 1999 












RI 3.61  3.40 25  1.28  1.19 25 
SC 6.60  6.48 29  5.29  5.17 31 
SD 4.36  4.12 27  1.32  1.23 26 
TN 4.86  4.76 28  4.27  4.17 29 
TX 1.09  0.99 20  -0.98  -0.89 20 
UT  -0.99  -0.94 17  -2.12  -2.00 17 
VA 2.48  2.36 24  0.88  0.84 23 
VT  -16.38  -13.41 1  -18.79  -15.12 1 
WA  10.46  10.80 39  9.29  9.58 38 
WI  -7.07  -5.71 4  -9.36  -7.48 5 
WV -5.43  -4.93  8  -6.02  -5.43  10 
WY  21.08  24.10 48  20.46  23.35 48 
   39 
 
Table 7   
Percentage Cuts in the PV of Spending Needed for Present Value Budget Balance 
















AK  48.12 47.16 49.10  50.11 46.26  47.92 
AL 10.22 9.05  11.45  12.74 7.97  10.15 
AR  -6.49 -7.26 -5.64  -4.68 -7.94  -6.60 
AZ  4.77 3.20 6.38  8.03 1.70  4.97 
CA 12.96  10.95  15.08  17.34 9.10  13.07 
CO 13.48  11.25  15.92  18.62 9.29  13.80 
CT  -9.99 -10.68  -9.10  -7.97 -11.21  -10.20 
DE -7.94  -9.27  -6.39  -4.60  -10.39  -8.12 
FL 2.58  0.80  4.52  6.65  -0.79  2.53 
GA  -1.28 -2.09 -0.39  0.62 -2.81  -1.31 
HI  8.63 7.81 9.55  10.60 7.10  8.43 
IA  7.96 6.24 9.75  11.63 4.63  7.75 
ID  -5.32 -6.54 -3.98  -2.49 -7.62  -5.14 
IL  0.96 -0.68  2.83  4.94 -2.09  0.80 
IN 0.68  0.02  1.46  2.39  -0.53  0.54 
KS  8.41 7.83 9.03  9.71 7.31  8.08 
KY  -1.29 -2.73  0.30  2.05 -4.00  -1.25 
LA  3.02 1.96 4.08  5.15 0.94  2.85 
MA  9.56 8.59  10.81  12.39 7.88  9.53 
MD  8.32 6.66  10.13  12.12 5.18  8.26 
ME  -4.59 -6.36 -2.59  -0.35 -7.88  -4.83 
MI  -11.95 -13.18 -10.61  -9.15 -14.29  -12.24 
MN  0.27 -2.31  3.04  6.04 -4.63  0.19 
MO  -7.00 -8.14 -5.75  -4.39 -9.16  -7.27 
MS  -4.35 -5.13 -3.52  -2.60 -5.82  -4.43 
MT  7.25 6.62 7.96  8.77 6.09  7.30 
NC  -9.53 -10.80  -8.29  -7.05 -12.04  -9.60 
ND  42.22 39.95 44.70  47.39 37.92  42.10 
NE  -5.13 -5.59 -4.57  -3.88 -5.96  -5.24 
NH  14.70 13.78 15.83  17.21 13.07  14.68 
NJ  -6.47 -7.87 -4.94  -3.25 -9.12  -6.62 
NM  13.48 12.97 13.99  14.51 12.49  13.45 
NV  -4.53 -6.08 -2.87  -1.05 -7.48  -4.20 
NY  12.92 12.07 13.87  14.94 11.34  12.91 
OH  10.73 8.08  13.52  16.43 5.63  10.45 
OK  -2.92 -3.69 -2.07  -1.14 -4.38  -3.09 
OR  16.25 14.34 18.30  20.48 12.60  16.39 
PA  9.17 6.89  11.63  14.30 4.86  8.78 
RI 1.28  0.28  2.44  3.80  -0.55  1.28 
SC  5.29 4.24 6.45  7.71 3.32  5.35   40 
 
















SD  1.32 -0.10  2.83  4.46 -1.39  1.21 
TN  4.27 3.44 5.18  6.17 2.70  4.24 
TX -0.98  -2.57 0.63  2.27  -4.08  -0.93 
UT  -2.12 -3.24 -0.85  0.61 -4.20  -1.92 
VA  0.88 -0.58  2.47  4.21 -1.89  0.87 
VT  -18.79 -19.57 -17.79  -16.54 -20.15  -18.97 
WA 9.29 7.23  11.49  13.82 5.35  9.54 
WI  -9.36 -12.18  -6.43  -3.39 -14.81  -9.61 
WV -6.02 -6.40 -5.45  -4.64 -6.61  -5.95 
WY 20.46 19.55 21.40  22.39 18.69  20.35 
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Table 8   
Percentage Increases in PV of Receipts Needed for Present Value Budget Balance 
















AK  77.24 75.47 79.09  81.03 73.82  76.98 
AL  9.95 8.81  11.16  12.45 7.76  9.85 
AR  -5.79 -6.49 -5.03  -4.18 -7.11  -5.88 
AZ  4.55 3.06 6.08  7.65 1.63  4.75 
CA 13.56  11.38  15.91  18.48 9.42  13.69 
CO 13.59  11.24  16.23  19.26 9.22  13.97 
CT  -8.10 -8.63 -7.42  -6.54 -9.03  -8.26 
DE  -6.75 -7.84 -5.48  -3.98 -8.75  -6.89 
FL 2.62  0.81  4.63  6.88  -0.80  2.57 
GA  -1.15 -1.88 -0.35  0.56 -2.52  -1.17 
HI  8.44 7.61 9.38  10.47 6.90  8.24 
IA  8.11 6.36 9.94  11.88 4.73  7.89 
ID  -4.82 -5.92 -3.61  -2.26 -6.90  -4.66 
IL  0.90 -0.63  2.67  4.72 -1.93  0.75 
IN 0.63  0.02  1.35  2.21  -0.49  0.50 
KS  8.03 7.52 8.59  9.22 7.05  7.69 
KY  -1.18 -2.51  0.28  1.90 -3.67  -1.15 
LA  2.66 1.73 3.60  4.54 0.83  2.52 
MA  9.80 8.72  11.22  13.07 7.93  9.76 
MD  8.06 6.41 9.91  11.99 4.97  8.01 
ME  -4.00 -5.49 -2.28  -0.31 -6.77  -4.19 
MI  -9.65 -10.65  -8.56  -7.39 -11.58  -9.87 
MN  0.24 -2.07  2.77  5.57 -4.14  0.17 
MO  -6.34 -7.37 -5.21  -3.99 -8.31  -6.57 
MS  -3.94 -4.65 -3.17  -2.33 -5.30  -4.00 
MT  7.16 6.54 7.86  8.67 6.02  7.22 
NC -7.93  -9.03  -6.85  -5.81  -10.12  -7.96 
ND  80.20 74.26 87.17  95.45 69.29  79.81 
NE  -4.76 -5.19 -4.24  -3.60 -5.53  -4.86 
NH  15.69 14.57 17.11  18.86 13.71  15.64 
NJ  -5.24 -6.37 -4.01  -2.65 -7.39  -5.37 
NM  14.29 13.82 14.78  15.27 13.35  14.27 
NV  -4.21 -5.66 -2.66  -0.98 -6.97  -3.91 
NY  12.92 12.03 13.94  15.12 11.26  12.92 
OH  10.24 7.69  12.94  15.82 5.35  9.96 
OK  -2.45 -3.10 -1.74  -0.95 -3.69  -2.60 
OR  15.71 13.77 17.82  20.14 12.05  15.87 
PA  8.93 6.67  11.43  14.22 4.68  8.53 
RI 1.19  0.26  2.29  3.58  -0.51  1.18 
SC  5.17 4.14 6.31  7.59 3.23  5.21   42 
 
















SD  1.23 -0.10  2.66  4.21 -1.30  1.13 
TN  4.17 3.36 5.07  6.07 2.63  4.14 
TX -0.89  -2.32 0.57  2.06  -3.69  -0.84 
UT  -2.00 -3.05 -0.81  0.58 -3.96  -1.81 
VA  0.84 -0.55  2.35  4.02 -1.79  0.83 
VT  -15.12 -15.69 -14.41  -13.51 -16.11  -15.25 
WA 9.58 7.40  11.95  14.55 5.45  9.86 
WI -7.48  -9.75  -5.14  -2.72  -11.88  -7.67 
WV -5.43 -5.76 -4.94  -4.24 -5.94  -5.38 
WY 23.35 22.33 24.42  25.54 21.37  23.21 
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Table 9   
1999 State General Obligation Bond Ratings 
State  Moody’s 
G. O. Rating 
S&P’s  
G. O. Rating 
Imbalance 
Measured 
Relative to the 
PV of Spending 
Imbalance 
Measured 
Relative to the 
PV of Receipts 
AK Aa2  AA  48.12  77.24 
AL Aa3  AA  10.22  9.95 
AR Aa3  AA  -6.49  -5.79 
AZ --*  --*  4.77  4.55 
CA Aa3  AA-  12.96  13.56 
CO --  --  13.48  13.59 
CT Aa3  AA  -9.99  -8.10 
DE Aa1  AA+  -7.94  -6.75 
FL Aa2  AA+  2.58  2.62 
GA Aaa  AAA  -1.28  -1.15 
HI A1  A+  8.63  8.44 
IA --  --  7.96  8.11 
ID --  --  -5.32  -4.82 
IL Aa2  AA  0.96  0.90 
IN Aa1  AA+  0.68  0.63 
KS --  AA+  8.41  8.03 
KY Aa2  AA  -1.29  -1.18 
LA A2  A-  3.02  2.66 
MA Aa3  AA-  9.56  9.80 
MD Aaa  AAA  8.32  8.06 
ME Aa2  AA+  -4.59  -4.00 
MI Aa1  AA+  -11.95  -9.65 
MN Aaa  AAA  0.27  0.24 
MO Aaa  AAA  -7.00  -6.34 
MS Aa3  AA  -4.35  -3.94 
MT Aa3  AA-  7.25  7.16 
NC Aaa  AAA  -9.53  -7.93 
ND --  AA-  42.22  80.20 
NE --  --  -5.13  -4.76 
NH Aa2  AA+  14.70  15.69 
NJ Aa1  AA+  -6.47  -5.24 
NM Aa1  AA+  13.48  14.29 
NV Aa2  AA  -4.53  -4.21 
NY A2  A+  12.92  12.92 
OH Aa1  AA+  10.73  10.24 
OK Aa3  AA  -2.92  -2.45 
OR Aa2  AA  16.25  15.71 
PA Aa3  AA  9.17  8.93 
RI Aa3  AA-  1.28  1.19 
SC Aaa  AAA  5.29  5.17   44 
 
State  Moody’s 
G. O. Rating 
S&P’s  
G. O. Rating 
Imbalance 
Measured 
Relative to the 
PV of Spending 
Imbalance 
Measured 
Relative to the 
PV of Receipts 
SD --  --  1.32  1.23 
TN Aaa  AAA  4.27  4.17 
TX Aa1  AA  -0.98  -0.89 
UT Aaa  AAA  -2.12  -2.00 
VA Aaa  AAA  0.88  0.84 
VT Aa1  AA  -18.79  -15.12 
WA Aa1  AA+  9.29  9.58 
WI Aa2  AA  -9.36  -7.48 
WV Aa3  AA-  -6.02  -5.43 
WY --  AA  20.46  23.35 
 
     * State was not ranked by the respective agency in 1999   45 
 
Table 10   
1990 State General Obligation Bond Ratings 
State  Moody’s 
G. O. Rating 
S&P’s  
G. O. Rating 
Imbalance 
Measured 
Relative to the 
PV of Spending 
Imbalance 
Measured 
Relative to the 
PV of Receipts 
AK Aa  AA-  47.58  74.30 
AL Aa  AA  10.63  10.38 
AR Aa  AA  -4.95  -4.44 
AZ --*  --  6.67  6.39 
CA Aaa  AAA  13.72  14.33 
CO --  --  12.73  12.77 
CT Aa  AA  -8.26  -6.78 
DE Aa  AA+  -6.50  -5.53 
FL Aa  AA  3.91  3.98 
GA Aaa  AA+  0.00  0.00 
HI Aa  AA  8.72  8.53 
IA --  --  9.79  10.00 
ID --  --  -4.23  -3.84 
IL Aaa  AA+  1.89  1.77 
IN --  --  1.54  1.43 
KS --  --  8.17  7.81 
KY --  --  -0.04  -0.04 
LA Baa1  A  6.76  6.03 
MA Baa  BBB  9.66  9.87 
MD Aaa  AAA  8.93  8.65 
ME Aa1  AAA  -2.64  -2.31 
MI A1  AA  -9.13  -7.49 
MN Aa  AA+  2.17  1.97 
MO Aaa  AAA  -5.61  -5.09 
MS Aa  AA-  -3.41  -3.09 
MT Aa  AA-  7.15  7.08 
NC Aaa  AAA  -6.58  -5.53 
ND --  --  42.05  78.52 
NE --  --  -4.05  -3.78 
NH Aa1  AA+  14.93  15.94 
NJ Aaa  AAA  -3.73  -3.08 
NM Aa  AA  14.16  15.07 
NV Aa  AA  -2.94  -2.74 
NY A  A  12.68  12.64 
OH Aa  AA  11.97  11.47 
OK Aa  AA  -1.36  -1.15 
OR Aa  AA-  16.63  16.06 
PA A1  AA-  10.40  10.13 
RI Aa  --  3.61  3.40 
SC Aaa  AAA  6.60  6.48   46 
 
State  Moody’s 
G. O. Rating 
S&P’s 
G. O. Rating 
Imbalance 
Measured 
Relative to the 
PV of Spending 
Imbalance 
Measured 
Relative to the 
PV of Receipts 
SD --  --  4.36  4.12 
TN Aaa  AA+  4.86  4.76 
TX Aa  AA  1.09  0.99 
UT Aaa  AAA  -0.99  -0.94 
VA Aaa  AAA  2.48  2.36 
VT Aa  AA  -16.38  -13.41 
WA Aa  AA  10.46  10.80 
WI Aa  AA  -7.07  -5.71 
WV A1  A+  -5.43  -4.93 
WY --  --  21.08  24.10 
 
     * State was not ranked by the respective agency in 1990 